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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to identify a
systematic process for improving ground operations
for future launch systems. This approach is based
on the Total Quality Management (TQM) continous
improvement process. While the continuous
improvement process is normally identified with
making incremental changes to an existing systems,
it can be used on new systems if they use past
experience as a knowledge base. in the case of the
Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV), the Space Shuttle
operations provide many lessons. ."
The TQM methodology used for t6is paper will
be borrowed from the United State Air Force "Quaiity
Air Force" Program. There is a general overview of
the continuous improvement process, with
concentration on the..formulation phase. During this
phase critical analyses are conducted to determine
the strategy and goals for the remaining
development process. These analyses include
analyzing the mission from the customer point of
view, developing an operations concept for the
future, assessing current capabilities, and
determining the gap to be closed between current
capabilities and future needs and requirements. A
brief analyses of the RLV, relative to the Space
Shuttle, will be used to illustrate the concept.
Using the continuous improvement design
concept has many advantages. These include a
customer oriented process which will develop a more
marketable product and a better integration of
operations and systems during the design phase.
But, the use of TQM techniques will require changes,
including more discipline in the design process and
more emphasis on data gathering for operational
systems. The benefits will far outweigh the
additional effort.
Introduction
The top emphasis in the launch vehicle design
world is the reduction of launch costs. This emphasis
is illustrated by the increasing number of low cost
launch systems in study, design, and early
operations. Why all this sudden interest in reducing
costs?
There are several major reasons. First, the
government, a major user of launch services, has
decided to launch its payloads (where feasible) on
commercial launch vehicles. Given that most
government agencies will be forced to reduce their
budgets, the government will be looking for the most
economical and efficient launch systems. Second,
the marketing of launch services to commercial
industries is also an area of increased competition.
The Ariane launch system continues to be the
predominant player in the launch services arena, but
it aqd the U. S. launch vehicle manufacturers will
face increased competition from Japan, Russia, and
China. Finally, many believe that if launch costs can
be reduced sufficiently then new customers for
launch services will enter the market.
But is launch cost the only factor? More likely
the customer for launch services, a government or
private entity, is looking for the best value. To the
launch services customer value maybe a function of
cost, dependability, reliability, or other factors.
Value to the customer is the heart of Total Quality
Management (TQM).
It is the purpose of this paper to look at the
design of operations for new launch systems from
the Quality perspective. Unfortunately this paints a
rather broad perspective, so some limits must be
established. First, the paper will be limited to
reusable launch vehicles, and more specifically to
the vehicle turnaround process. These are the
actions necessary to process the vehicle from the
landing on one mission to liftoff on the next.
Turnaround operations were selected because they
are a key value driver in reusable launch system
operations. Second, the examples utilize the
proposed Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) with
Space Shuttle operations providing the knowledge
base. Third, because it is impossible to evaluate the
specific operations for every RLV configuration, the
level of analysis will be kept at the subsystem level.
In turn, the subsystems considered will include only
those common to most RLV configurations.
Fortunately most configurations have the same basic
subsystems. Finally, this paper does not intend to
provide solutions for improving launch system
turnaround processing. Rather this is an example of
how TQM should be applied to the questions of
9round processin 9 and customer value.
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Continuous Improvement
The heart of Total Quality Management is
continuous process improvement. Continuous
process improvement is a systematic, iterative
method of improving a process. Many organizations
have instituted continuous process improvement,
each using an approach best suited for their
environment.
The basis for this analysis is the Quality Focus
method used by the United States Air Force as part
of the Quality Air Force (QAF) program. This
approach was selected because it is essentially
driven by aircraft operations. (Since the RLV is
striving toward aircraft-like operations this appears to
be a good match.) In addition, it has the advantage
of being well documented.
Quality Focus is an iterative process based on
the Shewhart cycle, in which there are four stages
for each process review iteration. [1:7"r] These are
ptan, do, study, and act. During the planning stage
data is gathered on the existing process and it is
analyzed for potential areas of improvement. Based
on the results of the planning stage, potential
improvements will be implemented on a small scale
during the "do" stage. During the study stage the
results of the pilot projects will be analyzed to see if
there are significant improvements. Finally, If there
are significant improvements, the improvements
will be made a permanent part of the process during
the "act" stage. [1:233]
The Air Force Quality Focus method tailors the
Shewhart cycle to fit the activities necessary for
process planning. The relationships between Quality
Focus and the Shewhart Cycle are illustrated in
Figure 1. As illustrated in the figure the Quality
Focus is also broken down into four phases;
formulation, deployment, implementation, and
review. As noted in the illustration these phases
overlap the stages of the Shewhart cycle. [1:71]
The formulation phase of the cycle develops a
plan for implementing continuous improvement.
During this phase the organization determines the
purpose of the process by clearly identifying the
organization's mission, its customers, and the
customer's needs, requirements, and desires. It
evaluates where the organization is now and where it
wants to be in the future with respect to its goals.
Finally the organization determines the gap between
the two, and sets goals and objectives for making
the improvements. [1:71]
The second phase of the quality focus is
deployment. This phase also considers the goals
and objectives of the effort. This is repeated since
there are often trade-offs to be made between the
formulation and deployment stages. Based on the
goals and objectives, functional plans are developed
for implementation ol changes. [1:74]
The third phase ot Quality Focus is
implementation. Here the functional plans
developed in the previous phase are used to make
corrections to the process flow. But implementation
does not stop here, data must be collected for use in
the final phase of the process. [1:75]
The final phase is the review of the data
collected to ascertain if the changes to the process
are effective. It the reviews show a positive result,
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the changesare made to the process,and the
continuousimprovementprocessgoesto the next
iteration.In doingso,theprocessis refinedto best
meetcustomerneeds[1:77]
This paper will only focus on part of the
formulation phase of the Quality Focus process.
There are several reasons for doing this. First, is
that the entire process is far beyond the scope of this
paper. It would be very difficult with a generic
vehicle to the determine functional plans, and
impossible to implement and review those plans.
Second, it is the purpose of this study to
demonstrate a method of analyzing ground
operations, not in suggesting changes which would
be dependent on a vehicle configuration.
The Formulation Phase
The components of the formulation phase and
their definitions are illustrated in Figure 2. Those
items in bold print are the portions of tlTe formulation
stage that are relevant to this paper. The others
including Planning to Plan, Values Assessment, and
Develop Strategic Goals and Objectives must be
determined by the organization conducting the
process and are again outside the scope of this
study.
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Figure 2: Steps Of The Formulation Stage
The first two steps to be considered are an
analysis of the purpose of the process and
envisioning how we would like the process to be in
the future. To analyze the mission it is necessary to
determine what is of value to launch service
customers. Based on what the customer perceives
as value, we will envision a turnaround process and
vehicle design that will meet those needs.
The remaining steps of the formulation phase
are to determine current process capabilities, and
the gap between those capabilities and our "vision"
of the future. To accomplish these steps requires
one key assumption. That is the new turnaround
process will be a refinement of an existing
turnaround process. For our example, the RLV
process would be based on the Space Shuttle
process. While many would like the RLV process to
be entirely new and separate from earlier Shuttle
operations, such an approach has many pitfalls.
Most RLV configurations will require many of the
same processes that the Shuttle currently requires.
While we can not afford to repeat the mistakes of
the Shuttle process, neither can we afford to ignore
the lessons learned. For this study the Shuttle and
its turnaround process will be our current capability,
and the gap between the Shuttle process and our
vision of the RLV future will determine where the
current process must be changed.
Analysis Mission
Simply stated the purpose of the P,LV system is
to provide launch services to Low Earth Orbit (LEO).
This is to be accomplished providing the greatest
value to the launch services customer, while
prov]Jing the vendor of launch services a
reasonable profit. One of the keys to customer
value is found in turnaround operations.
The mission of turnaround operations is to return
the vehicle to flight status after the preceding
mission. This includes safeing the vehicle,
conducting necessary inspections, replacing
components that have failed (or that are estimated
to fail during the next mission), and servicing the
vehicle for the next mission. How this is
accomplished, including the time allotted, is
determined based on customer requirements.
But customer requirements have many factors,
with varying importance depending on the
customer's activities. A presentation by Rhodes [2]
of NASA KSC, at the AIAA Space Operations and
Support Technical Committee, Low Cost Operations
Workshop provides breakdown of these factors.
While the original purpose of the presentation was
launch system affordability, it closely relates to
customer value.
Figure 3 illustrates the breakdown of affordability
factors. At the top of the hierarchy is the overall
affordability of the launch system. This is in turn
broken down into non-recurring and recurring costs.
In other terms, these are the cost of system
development and system operations respectively.
Non-recurring costs can be broken clown into
program acquisition cost and technology research
and development. Technology research and
development costs are the long-lead investments
necessary to identify, develop, demonstrate, and
mature technologies so that they are ready in time
for system development. Program acquisition costs
are the costs o! system development. This includes
the actual cost of design, manufacturing, and their
infrastructure; as well as costs related to
programmatic and technical risk. The impact of non-
recurring costs on the customer value depends on
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how the system operator decides to amortize their
investment. This falls outside the scope of this
paper.
Recurring costs--are the main focus because
these costs are directly related to turnaround
operations. In addition, these costs will make or
break the marketability of a reusable launch system.
Like non-recurring costs, recurring costs can be
broken down into two areas, dependability and
responsiveness. These areas, in addition to vehicle
performance are the key drivers of customer value.
Dependability is the ability of the system to
perform as scheduled. This includes both the
timeliness of a mission as well as the success of the
mission. It can be broken down into three factors;
Reliability, Performance Assurance, and Launch on
Time. Reliability is the probability that the system
will operate as planned. For the RLV, reliability Is
measured with three factors: (1) mission reliability,
the probability of flying the mission as planned, (2)
vehicle recoverability, the probability that the vehicle
will survive a mission, (3) passenger safe return, the
probability of recovering the passengers (even if the
vehicle is lost). The value of reliability to the
customer depends on their needs. For example, if
the customer is considering whether to launch on an
expendable or reusable system, mission reliability is
primary; vehicle recovery is the operator's problem.
For a Space Station crew rotation mission, all three
reliability parameters are important. In this case, the
customer is concerned with all mission phases from
launch to the safe return of the station crew and the
recovery of experiments being returned from orbit.
Dependability is also a function of performance
assurance. This is the vehicle's robustness including
operating margins and fault tolerances. Increased
performance assurance means that the system has
greater flexibility. The value to the customer here _s
the vehicle's ability to operate in a wide variety of
conditions. The more restrictive the performance
assurance, the more likely are launch delays.
Finally, dependability is a function of the
systems ability to launch on time. This means that
the launch system and its various processes are
designed to meet the requirements of the mission
manliest. Timeliness is based on the launch date
set when the customer contracts for services, not
when the vehicle is available for flight. The value to
the customer is confidence in the launch date.
The second area under recurring costs is
responsiveness. It too can be broken down into
greater detail. Its components are Flexibility,
Launch Rate, and Operability. For the customer
llexibility means that the system is capable of
changing to meet their needs rather than the other
way around. Responsiveness is also a function of
launch rate, which in turn is related to flexibility.
Responsivness is the capability to have the system
available on demand, and to accommodate rapid
response requirements.
Finally responsiveness is a function of
operability. Operability is the attributes of the launch
system that allow it meet mission requirements and
manifesting. To the customer, operability is a direct
concern, since the impact of operability is manifest
in the other factors of dependability and
responsiveness. In addition, operability is a major
impact operating costs which are transferred to the
customer.
Operability breaks down into Maintainability,
Supportability, and Simplicity. Maintainability is a
design factor that measures the ability of the
operator to maintain the system. It measures
include vehicle service requirements, access to
vehicle systems,and the processesnecessary
maintainthe vehicle;withsimplicitybeingthe key.
Anotherconsiderationof operabilityissupportability.
Supportabilityis what it takesto supportsystem
operations. It includessuch diverseareas as
logistics, personnel, and administration. Again the
key is simplicity. The last factor is simplicity of
design. The less complex the systems, the less
likely there will be failures. Again these are not really
value items for the customers to consider, rather
they are factors that the system designers and
operators must consider to drive theose parameters
which are of value to the customer.
In summary, the value of launch services is in
the eyes of the customer. Since it would be beyond
the scope of this paper to survey customer
requirements, the following assumption is made:
For the launch services customer, the primary
factors in the value of services are cost, reliability,
flexibility, and schedule dependability. The
customer would expect to pay a reason_qble price fa]"
the launch services. Which would drive the launch
system operator to streamline turnaround operations
as much as possible. The customer also values the
reliability of the system. Which would drive the
turnaround process- to ensure that required
maintenance and servicing is accomplish before
flight, but without adding unnecessary inspections
which drive costs up. Flexibility is also assumed to
be major value point for the launch services
customer. It ensures the customer that special or
changing mission requirements can be met. Finally,
schedule dependability ensures that customer that
the contracted services will be there when required.
Future Vision
The second step of the quality focus method is
the future vision, a vision of where we want to be.
One source of this vision is the Cooperative
Agreement Notice (CAN) for the Reusable Launch
Vehicle Demonstrator (X-33). [3] While this
document was concerned with a demonstrator of
technologies required for a reusable launch vehicle,
it also calls out goals for a future RLV.
Table 1 lists the minimum operations
requirements for the reusable launch vehicle. Each
of these requirements will be an improvement to the
existing capabilities of the Shuttle. This includes the
automation of pre-flight and flight operations, a
seven day maximum turnaround and a 3.5 day
maximum emergency turnaround. Under operability
there are requirements for schedule dependency and
robustness. Finally for reliability it includes
probabilities for sate recovery of the vehicle and the
1
crew.
Table 1:X-33 CAN Requirements And
Goals For RLV
• Automated pre-flight and flight Req
operations (launch, ascent, on-orbit,
reentry and landing
• The flight vehicle shall be capable of Req
safely aborting to the launch site
during the ascent phase if required
• Seven day maximum mission duration Req
• Seven day ground processing time Goal
from landing to launch
• 3.5 day ground processing time from Goal
'l&nding to launch for reflight under
emergency conditions
• The probability of launching within Req
TBD (sic) clays of scheduled is .95
• Maximize responsiveness to adverse Req
weather conditions
• Launch and landing at same location Req
(nominal condition)
• The flight vehicle shall be capable of Req
unplanned landing at alternative
landing sites with minimal support
equipment and facilities
• To the extent practical, on-board Req
subsystems required for flight vehicle
shall be field repairable/replaceable
• Equipment required to repair, process Req
and return vehicle to launch site shall
be transportable
• .995 Probability of safe recovery of the Req
flight vehicle per mission
• .999 Probability of safe recovery of the Req
human passengers per mission
The requirements spelled out in the CAN driv_
the overall goals of a new launch vehicle, but they
LThere is no reliability given for mission reliability.
In fact the .995 probability vehicle recovery has
proven to be a much more stringent requirement on
the system than the .98 mission reliability that has
generally been mentioned.
donotgiveanydirectionon how those goals will be
achieved. It would be up to the system developer to
determine guidelines for meeting the overall goals.
An example of these guidelines, is illustrated in
Table 2. This is a "vision" of an RLV operations
concept developed by the Vehicle Engineering
Directorate at the Kennedy Space Center. [4]
This list is a "vision" of the attributes that a future
launch system would have based on past experience
with other launch systems, particularly the Shuttle. It
is not a list of requirements, but rather goals to be
met in the future. The "vision" calls for a system
that is highly automated or autonomous, meaning
less of a standing army and Ground Support
Equipment (GSE) necessary to process the system.
It also calls for a more simplified and robust vehicle
that has wider operating margins requiring fewer
periodic inspections and vehicle type certification
like aircraft, rather than individual flight certification
as on the Shuttle. The processing of the system i_
also more simplified and interfaces-between the
ground and payloads are more standardized.
Finally, it envisions a system where operations,
vehicle systems, and payloads all have an input into
the vehicle design.
In summary, the'tuture vision of a launch system
is a goal that we are designing to reach. For this
example the assumed vision of turnaround
operations is a relatively simple process that is
conducted with a high degree of automation. The
process is relatively uncomplicated and strives
toward aircraft operations, meaning replenishment of
consumables and correction of failures. There is no
recertification with attendant testing and inspections.
The process is highly reliable and robust, meaning
few failures of flight and ground systems during
processing. The process meets scheduled launch
dates with a high degree of dependability, and is
highly flexible, capable of accommodating late
changes to payload or schedule.
Assess Current Capability
The next step is to evaluate our current capabilities,
in this case the current status of the Space Shuttle.
Because of the many aspects of turnaround
processing, a proper assessment would again be far
beyond the scope of this paper. As a result we will
consider only the value of schedule dependency to
the customer in our RLV / Shuttle example.
One of the major criticisms of the Space Shuttle
is its launch delays. While the most publicized of
the delays are on-pad delays, there are many other
delays that account for a much greater schedule
slips. In fact changes in the launch date are based
on three factors: First, the variability in mission
planning times. Second, variability in vehicle
turnaround processing times. Finally, the impact of
Table 2: RLV Operations Concept "VISION"
Provide a simplified, very-highly automated
vehicle enabling minimum periodic and
repetitive maintenance.
Strive to isolate vehicle ground processing
from dependence on tacilities and GSE.
Routine turnaround should replenish
consumables only.
Promote vehicle health monitoring /
management systems and self-test at a level
which supplies only O&M related information
that requires corrective action prior to next
flight.
• Eliminate "flight readiness-style" vehicle
,., recertification for every flight. Provide
aircraft-style vehicle-type certificate.
Design in performance margins and flight
hardware allowances to eliminate processing
impacts (i.e. strive to eliminate unscheduled
work.)
Reduce operations and hardware complexity
for maximum utilization of resources and
eliminate opportunity for human-induced
system failures.
Employ near autonomous ground
management planning at top levels. Focus
on automatic interactive scheduling of flight
vehicle, ground support facilities, and
support logistics.
Adapt minimum standardized payload
interfaces to assure maximum flexibility and
affordability.
on-pad delays due to weather, and ground or flight
system failures.
Delays due to mission planning occur trom the
time the customer and the operator agree on a
contract for launch services until all planning and
preparation for the mission are complete. For the
Shuttle, delays are due to changes in the manifest;
delays in planning mission timelines, crew training,
and unavailability of facilities or equipment. Many of
these problems are due to the need to assign a
specific vehicle to the mission earlier in the process.
This is due to differences in vehicle flight attributes
and can make a mission dependent on all of the
prior missions using that vehicle. Unfortunately there
is no data kept on this type of delay. As a result it is
impossible to assess the problem or to develop an
analysis o! the gap between the current process and
6
our envisioned process. Fortunately the general
RLV concept calling for "mass produced", identical
vehicles with standard payload interfaces may take
care of this type of delay. In addition, automated
mission planning may also make the planning
process more adaptable to changes.
Ground processing delays are the delays that
occur because of vehicle and ground systems
problems from the time the vehicle lands from the
previous mission to the time the next countdown
starts. These delays can be attributed to either
vehicle system failures or failures in the turnaround
process. Since we would like to have the greatest
impact for the design dollar, our assessment must
identify which subsystems and processes are giving
us the greatest problems.
Vehicle systems failures impact two customer
concerns, reliability of the system and schedule
dependability. To properly evaluate subsystem and
component reliability a large data base _f
component failure data is required. Unfortunately,
the Shuttle data collection system is not designed to
track component failure rates. As an indicator of
relative subsystem failure rates we will use the
historical vehicle flight failure data.
Figure 4 [5:78] _'hows the distribution of failures
attributed to each subsystem for vehicle failures
(excluding failures attributed to payloads or upper
stages). The bars labeled for all failures consider all
launches by any vehicle ever used for space launch
operations, with data going back to 1954. For
ballistic missiles later used for space launches, it
includes the ballistic launches. The data is also cut
for launches after 1970. These are assumed to be a
better indicator of current capability, since they do
not include early launches by less sophisticated
vehicles.
Note that Figure 4 is for loss of mission. A loss
of mission failure for the RLV is defined as a failure
where the vehicle could not complete its mission.
This type of failure may or may not result in the loss
of the vehicle. This results in an obvious conflict with
expendable vehicles which are never recovered, and
which make up the vast majority of historical data.
Because there is so little historical data on reusable
vehicles, it is necessary to use the expendable data
to get a better estimate of current launch vehicle
reliability. Since expendable and reusable launch
vehicle have many similar subsystems, though
operating for different periods of time, it seems
reasonable to use the data for a first cut at
reliabilities.
In examining the figure, note that the propulsion
system has always been a major contributor to loss
of mission. For this analysis, the propulsion system
is considered to be anything up stream of the
turbopumps, including fuel storage and feed
syst_7"ns, vent/purge systems, and the pressurization
system. While it appears that this problem is worse
in the 1970 and later data, this can be deceiving.
What this data shows is the percentage of all failures
by subsystem. The reliability of the propulsion
system is improving, but not to the extent of other
subsystems. As a result, the proportion of failures
contributed by the propulsion system is considerably
greater.
Based on the historical data a success ratio,
total success'total launches, can be derived. The
values for current launch vehicles (expendable and
reusable) flown since 1970 are listed in Table 3.
This data will be considered as the current level for
subsystem reliability. In the next section we will
compare it to the what is required in the RLV vision.
As noted earlier, turnaround process reliability
also impacts customer value. A study by Flemming
[6} of Lockheed Martin, looked at the impact of
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Figure 4: Breakdown Of Vehicle Flight Failures By Subsystem
process reliability on turnaround processing flow
times. The reliability of a process for this study was
the percent of the time when no problems were
encounter during that specific process. The study
looked at the seven processes that are part of the
Table 3: Estimated SubSytem Reliability
Subsystem Success Ratio
Structures .9979
Propulsion Systems .9764
Engines .9914
Thermal Protection System .9979
Attitude Control System .9979
Avionics .9935
GN&C .9999
Power .9936
Other Avionics .9999
Human .9936
Other Unknown .9936
overall Shuttle turnaround process. These include
mechanical, electrical, propulsion, thermal
protection, avionics, and landing gear system
checkouts; and propeJlant loading.
The study used Problem Report (PR) data from
the Shuttle turnaround process. This data consisted
of the number of process runs that contained
failures, the total number of process runs, and
measures of Mean Time To Repair (M'I-I-R).
Actually the evaluation used three measures of
MTTR. The first (MTTR 1) was hands-on repair time
which starts when troubleshooting is complete and
continues until the repairs are complete except for
testing and closeout. The second measure (MTTR
2) is active repair time and includes all of the first
measure plus troubleshooting, test time, and
closeout. The final measure of MTTR (MTTR 3) is
the overall repair time which includes active repair
time plus any administrative time. With the MTTR
calculated, the dollar cost of process unreliability can
be calculated by using a average hourly
compensation rate.
A summary of the data for the Shuttle
turnaround process (current baseline) is shown in
Table 4. The data includes the process success
ratio for each of the listed areas. The data will be
used to determine the process reliability "gap"
between the current turnaround process and the
reliability required to fit the time constraints of our
RLV vision.
Table 4: Current Shuttle Process Reliability
Success
Process Ratio
• -1r
Propulsion Systems Checkout .80
Mechanical Systems Checkout .64
Electrical Systems Checkout .72
Avionics Systems Checkout .63
Thermal Protection System Checkout .60
Landing Gear Checkout .25
Propellant Loadinq .20
The final type of delay to be evaluated is the on-
pad delay. While these delays generally result in the
least impact to the scheduled launch date, their
visibility to the public and the media give them much
more weight. The impact of these delays may
increase with the start of space station missions.
These missions require much shorter launch
windows due to the need to reduce orbital phasing
times to a minimum. The phasing time needs to be
minimized since longer times in orbit will drive the
Cause Of Delay
Figure 5: Comparison Of Shuttle And RLV Launch Delays
design of the subsystems and will usually result in
unacceptable weight increases. It is generally
accepted that a launch window of five minutes witl
be allowed.
The launch delay data illustrated in Figure 5 is
for the Space Shuttle, and was collected by Weldon
[7] of NASA MSFC. The figure shows the number ot
delays attributed to weather and vehicle systems.
The data includes both delays that extend beyond
the launch day, and delays that result in a launch
later in the window, but in the same day. As the
figure shows, weather at the launch site or at the
abort sites (coded L/L) cause the most delays.
But this data can be misleading. Figure 6,
based on Lockheed Martin Operations data [8],
compares the number of delays to the cumulative
length of the delays. When the data is based on the
number of delays, regardless of length, weather is
the largest cause of delays. When the data is based
on the cumulative number of delay days, then the
liquid propulsion system is biggest cbntributor to
delays. To the customer the latter is the true driver.
It is many times important to look at data from
several different views to determine the true
problem.
Note that this data is only down to the subsystem
level, which is sufficient for this example. In
actuality the data must be down to the component
level to be useful for continuous improvement
efforts. It is essential that future launch systems
develop a data collection and analysis system prior
to the vehicle going operational. Lack of such a data
collection system for the Shuttle is a major
shortcoming in attempting to apply past experience
to future programs.
Gap Analysis
The final step that we will take in our analysis of
turnaround processing will be that of gap analysis.
This determines the gap between what our current
capability and the capability of our "vision" of the
future. The product of this analysis is a list of
problem areas that must be solved to maximize
customer value. Pdoritizing this list by customer
value will result in maximizing customer satisfaction
with limited funds. As noted in the previous section,
schedule dependability is based on vehicle and
process reliability, and on-pad launch delays. We
will first consider vehicle reliability.
To determine the gap between our current and
required reliability it is first necessary to determine a
quantifiable vision. The X-33 Cooperative
Agreement Notice (CAN) provides two goals, a .995
probability of vehicle recovery and a .999 probability
of safe passenger return. Which of these two goals
drive the system design depends on the vehicle
escape system and other factors. To simplify things
we will go with the vehicle recovery goal.
Subsystem goals can be achieved by allocating
"allowed" failures between the subsystem based on
the historical distribution ol failures. In this case a
reliability of .995 means that nominally there would
be five failures per thousand flights. If in the past,
propulsion system failures (not including engine
failures) accounted for 40 percent of the failures
then 40 percent of the five failures would be
allocated to propulsion systems. The result would be
a goal of two failures per thousand flights or .998
reliability. The allocations can be made down to
4)
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Figure 6: Number Of Delays Vs. Days Delay
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whateverlevel that failure data allows.
Once the reliability goals are determined it is
necessary to evaluate what will be necessary to
meet those goals. In the case of reliability goals,
reliability growth 2 of existing systems must be
projected to determine if the reliability goals can be
met with reliability growth alone. If it can not be
accomplished then it is necessary to look to new
designs and processes.
There are many methods which can be used to
assess reliability growth. The results of two such
methods are illustrated on Table 5. The columns
title "Trend Estimate" and "Trend Forecast" are
based on a regression equation that is an estimate of
the instantaneous success ratio (total success over
total flights). The "Trend Estimate" is an estimate of
the current success ratio calculated from the
equation for the present number of flights. The
"Trend Forecast" is an estimate of subsystem
reliability for 200 flights into the future. The value ol
200 was used because the average U.-S. flight rate
(all vehicles) is about 20 flights per year multiplied
Table 5: Reliabilit'r Allocations And Proiections
Trend
Estimate
Avionics
Subsystem .Allocation
Structures .9994 .9854 .9870
Prop. Systems .9982 .9311 .9411
Engines .9994 .9943 .9943
TPS .9999 " "
.9993 .9666 .9726
Trend
Forecast
• Indicates That This Was Not Considered
Data Base On Launch Data Since 1970
by the ten years (at the time of the study) until the
RLV is operational. These estimates were derived
from a trend model fitted to data in the United States
Launch Experience Data Base maintained by MSFC,
Program Development, Operations Analysis Branch.
[9]
The last column on Figure 7, entitled "Rockwell
Estimate" is based on projects using the Rockwell
MATrix model. The model is based on Shuttle data,
and uses a proprietary model to forecast reliability
based on vehicle characteristics and attributes. The
results show a much more optimistic view of meeting
our reliability goals because it assumes greater
reliability improvements than simply reliability growth
from flying the same hardware more often. The
point is that in analyzing the gap you must be clear
on the quality of the data, the accuracy of the
2 Reliability growth is the increase reliability of a
product as it matures. High failure rates in the early
in the product give way to lower rates as the design
matures. Thus, more testing and operational data
should show fewer failures causing the reliability to
grow.
modeling techniques, and the assumptions
necessary to gain the results.
For the case illustrated here, the reliability
estimates in the column titled "Trend Estimate" may
be considered lower bounds on subsystem reliability.
Future launch vehicle subsystem reliability should be
at least as good as these estimates. The estimates
in the column "Trend Forecast" suggest that
subsystem reliability for launch vehicles has, in
general, been improving since 1970 and may be
expected to improve. The Rockwell predictions, in
turn, may be considered achievable upper bounds
on subsystem reliability. The allocated reliability for
all but one subsystem (engines) are less that the
Rockwell estimates. This would indicate that
improvements in reliability, beyond that of reliability
growth, are required to meet the goals. In any case
development goals and strategies would be based
on the gap analysis and the confidence in the
results.
The gap analysis of ground process reliability
requires a comparison between the current Shuttle
turnaround process and the
turnaround process vision. This
Rockwell includes: (1) Develop a "vision"
Estimate o| turnaround processing. (2)
.9996 Determine the time required to
.9984 accomplish each task based on
.9943 previous experience. (3)
.9999 Allocate the turnaround
.9998 processing goal to process steps.
(4) Determining the variability
(reliability) of each task. (5)
Prioritize process steps requiring
change by cost to benelits ratio.
The first three tasks of the process analyses
require the development of a turnaround processing
timeline. Figure 7 illustrates an example of a
turnaround processing flow [5:111] 3. The example is
derived from a Shuttle flow, essentially without
modification. It is based on a generic RLV which
contains subsystems common to most current RLV
designs. Further, it was designed to match a 96
hour turnaround goal and individual task times are
allocations. Note, this in no way indicates that this
process flow is feasible, because it simply
proportions time.
The next step would to be to validate the
process by determining the feasibility of the process
times, and by eliminating those tasks that are
unnecessary for the specific RLV design. This s_ep
can be long and involved. It would require breaking
the each task down to the lowest level possible and
3 This is just and example, and does not fit the RLV
need for a quick turnaround
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determine whether each subtask is required, then
summing the times back to the task level. To do this
requires an adequate data base of historical tasks
and timelines. Unfortunately, the availability of such
data is limited, since operational data is not readily
available at the component level.
As a final comment the example obviously does
not fit the vision that we set forward earlier. But it is
indicative of the long way that we will have to go
from the first generation reusable vehicle (Shuttle) to
the next generation (RLV).
Assuming that the example turnaround
processing flow has been validated, it is now
necessary to look at the reliability of the process.
Table 4 presented the reliability for various tasks
within the turnaround process. Based on this data, a
nomograph of the relationship of reliability versus
processing time and cost can be constructed. The
nomograph is constructed by deriving the failure rate
from the reliability, measures of repair time, and the
cost of labor. An example of the-this type of
nomograph is displayed in Figure 8.
The homograph can be used to determine what
needs to be done to a process step. First, convert
Corrective
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Ficlure 8: Process Reliability Vs. Cost
he allocated task time to corrective maintenance
•ost using average hourly labor costs. Then choose
the appropriate MTTR curve and determine what
reliability is required to meet the allocations. If that
level of reliability does not seem reasonable then
basic changes must be made to the process or the
hardware.
The final example of gap analysis is for on-pad
launch delays. This is handled much like turnaround
processing reliability. The current delay data was
presented in Figures 5 and 6. Based on the design
of the vehicle and ground systems some of those
delays would not be applicable to the RLV, and
would be excluded from the data. The remaining
delay data can be statistically analyzed to determine
the likelihood of launch or the confidence of having a
launch over a given period.
Table 6 illustrates some of the data that can be
derived from delay data. This table compares the
Shuttle operational history of delays to projections
for an RLV. The RLV delays include all Shuttle
delays for weather and all delays for system
problems where the RLV has equivalent systems.
For example, Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster problems
would not be included, but most avionics problems
would be included.
The data in Table 7 cuts the data in several
ways. The two major columns are for probability of
launch anywhere in a launch window and for launch
within the first five minutes of a launch window
opening. The latter would be for missions to the
Space Station that have only a live minute launch
window. The rows cut the data into the probability of
launch on the day scheduled at the Flight Readiness
Review (FRR); the probability ot launch on the first
attempt, regardless of schedule; and the probability
of launch on any attempt. Again this is for a generic
RLV and actual designs will refine the estimates.
Summary
This paper has advocated and illustrated the use
of continuous improvement techniques in the
development of a new launch vehicle.
Taking the operations data from an
existing vehicle baseline and the
requirements for a new vehicle as a
goal, a systematic approach to vehicle
and operation design can be found
through continuous improvement
techniques.
The United States Air Force "Quality
Focus" method was used as a
methodology for continuous
improvement. The methodology is
based on the Shewhart Cycle which
uses a four step process for
improvement; plan, do, study and act.
Or formulate, deployment, implement,
and review for Quality Focus.
In this paper we concentrated on the formulation
stage. During this stage the organization must
clearly identify the purpose of the process by
identifying the organization's mission, customers,
and the customer's needs and requirements. Four
steps of the formulation process are the key to the
design: (1) Analyze the mission of the proposed
system; (2) Determine the "vision" of the proposed
system by determining the system goals and
requirements; (3) Analyze current capabilities; (4)
Determine the gap between the current capabilities
and the vision. After determining the gaps to be
filled, a strategy is developed for the design and
development process of the launch system.
Using the Total Quality Management techniques
in the development of launch system provides a
I2
Tabie6: SummaryOfLaunchDependability
First Scheduled Date
Probability Of Launch Within
Window
Shuttle
.37
RLV
.59
First Attempt .56
Any Attempt .57
Io, lical way to develop a launch system. For launch
c }erations it means working to streamline operations
to those tasks that provide value to the customer. In
addition, concentrating on customer value should
also drive a more operations oriented design.
The use of these techniques in the development
of a new system does change the way we tend to 4.
operate. First and foremost of these is developing
design discipline. In most projects there is a urge to
dive into the design of a system before really
defining the goal of the project or final product. 5.
Using a more systematic method has great benefits
but requires more discipline. The second change _
to place more emphasis on the-collection of
operating data for a system. We need to determine
the essential launch system data, including ground 6.
processing data, and to ensure it is collected.
Unless this data is collected all future designs will be
based on assumptio'r_s of what happened in the past
rather than fact. 7.
Probability Of Launch Within
Five Minute Window
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